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ARTFUL PLEADING AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
FOOD MANUFACTURING DEFECT CASES: IS IT TOO EASY TO
GET TO A JURY?
CARL CROSBY LEHMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines cases where plaintiffs claim to have been
injured by ingesting a foreign' contaminant placed in a food product
before the product left the hands of the defendant-manufacturer. 2
Although these cases are numerous and span decades, they often consist
of very similar assertions by both parties. 3 Because of a lack of direct
evidence on either side, plaintiffs usually trace the chain of custody from
the point of purchasing the product to the time of ingestion in an effort
to raise an inference that the alleged defect existed in the product when it
was packaged at the defendant's factory. Defendants routinely counter
with evidence of their manufacturing process, attempting to establish the
impossibility of the defect either finding its way into the product, or
occurring in the manner that the plaintiff asserts.4
* The author is an associate with Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, PA. of Minneapolis,
Minnesota. Mr. Crosby Lehmann practices in the areas of products liability and employment defense
litigation.
1. "Foreign" means both in the sense that the defect is unnatural to the food product itself as well
as to the manufacturing process. The cases examined here are distinguishable from cases where, for
example, a consumer is injured by swallowing a bone, or injured by a machine part that has fallen into
a product during the manufacturing process. See, e.g., Kneibel v. RRM Enterprises, 506 N.W.2d 664
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
2. This article does not address claims that a defendant is liable for the defective design of its
packaging or any other theories where the manufacturer may be found liable for intentional tampering
by third persons.
3. Compare Richenbacher v. California Packing Corp., 145 N.E. 281 (Mass. 1924) and Campbell
Soup Co. v. Gates, 889 S.W.2d 750 (Ark. 1994). Although seventy years separate these two cases, the
plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence attempting to prove that the defendants' product left the factory
with the defect is essentially the same, as is the defendants' use of evidence of its manufacturing
process and techniques. Id.
4. Some defendants have not denied that a contaminant could have found its way into the
product, but have offered evidence of their manufacturing process to prove that the plaintiff's claims
are impossible for some other reason. See Williams v. General Baking Co., 98 A.2d 779, 780 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1953); Schneider v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 411 So. 2d 669, 671 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
Givens v. Baton Rouge Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 182 So. 2d 532 (La. Ct. App. 1966) (affirming
judgment against plaintiff who allegedly consumed a live insect in soft drink manufactured by
defendant, finding that evidence of defendant's manufacturing process established that it was
impossible for a worm to have been introduced into the bottle and not only remain undeteriorated, but
remain alive); Gustafson v. Gate City Co-op Creamery, 126 N.W.2d 121, 123 (S.D. 1964) (noting
defendant's evidence of its butter mixing process offered to prove that it was inconceivable for glass
to have shown up-a very great majority of it-on only the thin slice consumed by the plaintiff); Gates
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 719 P.2d 130, 136 (Wash. St. App. 1986) (recognizing that defendant's
evidence tended to prove that although a snake vertebra could have arrived with the peanuts and
made its way into a Baby Ruth candy bar, it could not have been spongy or rank after going through
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This article explores how courts have dealt with evidence proffered
by defendants of their manufacturing methods. This article supports the
view that not only is this evidence relevant and admissible, but, when
comprehensive and unrefuted, it should erase any inference to be drawn
from the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence; thereby requiring a plain-
tiff-consumer to present additional evidence in order to raise a question
of fact as to when the defect became present in the defendant's product.
Once a manufacturer presents evidence of its production procedures and
demonstrates the high improbability that the defect existed before the
product left the custody and control of the defendant, the plaintiff's
circumstantial evidence loses its probative force in establishing any
presumption of when the defect first appeared in the product. In order
to restore a fact question, the plaintiff should be required to refute the
defendant's evidence.
Such a rule best balances the interests of both parties. Manufactur-
ers are assured that plaintiffs are not provided easy access to a jury
through artful pleading and the expense of defending meritless, and
sometimes fraudulent, 5 claims is reduced. Plaintiffs can rebut the
evidence of the defendant's manufacturing techniques without too great
of a burden with evidence that there still existed an opportunity for the
contaminant to have been introduced into the product. 6 Under this
approach, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant's
manufacturing process is fallible. Instead, plaintiffs must merely present
evidence re-establishing a factual dispute as to whether or not the con-
taminant could have been introduced into the product while in the
custody of the manufacturer.
Part II examines the burdens of establishing a prima facie case
against manufacturers for injuries caused by defects in food or beverage
products. Part III explores the confusion still existing over whether a
defendant's evidence of its manufacturing techniques is even admissible
the production procedures).
5. See, e.g., Bolton v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 123 F.2d 526, 527 (7th Cir. 1941)
(affirming jury verdict for the plaintiff for injuries allegedly caused by swallowing glass embedded in
the defendant's product). Despite defendant's proof that it was physically impossible for glass located
in a person's stomach and intestines to work their way outward through the walls of her organs,
muscles, and tissues to the skin of her abdomen, the court held the jury verdict was not manifestly
contrary to the evidence since the jury could have found that the plaintiff's story was not entirely
false. Id. at 527-28. "The extent of the rejection of plaintiff's testimony was a matter solely for the
jury's determination." Id. at 528.
6. As argued below, plaintiff can still rely upon circumstantial evidence to raise a jury question.
See infra note 9 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs may simply be required to introduce evidence of
available opportunities for the defect to have become introduced into the product while the product
was still under the control of the defendant. Where the manufacturing procedures are complex and
do not provide any apparent opportunities, plaintiffs could hire an expert to observe the process and
testify as to different means by which the defect could have been introduced while in the defendant's
control.
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in these cases. Parts IV and V study the conflicting views of the impact a
defendant's proof of its manufacturing techniques has on a plaintiff's
evidence that she purchased a product in a sealed container and that at
no time after the container was opened did she or anyone else tamper
with the product. Some jurisdictions hold that these allegations establish
a factual issue of whether the defect existed at the time the product left
the defendant's control (Part IV). Other jurisdictions hold that a defen-
dant's evidence of its manufacturing process may erase any inferences
to be drawn from a plaintiff's circumstantial evidence, requiring the
plaintiff to produce additional proof in order to establish a question of
fact as to whether the product contained the defect at the time it left the
defendant's control (Part V). In Part VI, it is argued that the rule of
those jurisdictions requiring a plaintiff to rebut a defendant's evidence
of its manufacturing process best balances the interests of both parties.
II. GENERAL BURDENS OF PROOF IN ESTABLISHING A PRIMA
FACIE CASE AGAINST A MANUFACTURER FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY A FOREIGN OBJECT IN A FOOD OR BEVERAGE.
To establish a manufacturer's liability for damages which result
from the consumption of a contaminated food or beverage, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant's product contained a deleterious sub-
stance, that the substance was consumed, and that as a result of the
consumption, the plaintiff sustained an injury. 7 Whether an action is
brought in strict product liability, breach of warranty, misrepresentation,
or negligence, it is a consumer's burden to show that the complained
defect existed in the product at the time it left the custody and control of
the manufacturer or entity in the line of distribution being sued. 8 A lack
of direct evidence does not preclude recovery. A plaintiff may rely
upon circumstantial evidence to raise an inference that a contaminant
was introduced into the product while under the defendant's control.9
7. LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 So. 2d 873,874 (La. 1952).
8. Tardella v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 576 N.Y.S.2d 965,966 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
9. It is difficult to articulate exactly what evidence is sufficient in order to draw a reasonable
inference on any issue. This type of ruling will depend entirely upon the nature of the evidence
offered in the case at hand and it is difficult for such a ruling to serve as a precedent. See 9 WIGMORE,
EVtoENCE § 2494, at 383 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). In a leading scholarly piece on the subject, Professor
Fleming James wrote:
The question of sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a fact is more complex
and subtle. It turns on the concept of legitimacy of the desired inference. If A is shown,
then the trier may infer B from A if, but only if, the inference is a rational one. The test
of rationality is usually expressed in terms of probabilities. Where from the proven facts
the nonexistence of fact to be inferred appears to be just as probable as its existence (or
more probable than its existence), then the conclusion that it exists is a matter of
speculation, surmise, and conjecture, and a jury will not be allowed to draw it. This test
suggests mathematical precision, but the suggestion is spurious. For one thing, we lack
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In order for a question of fact to exist over when a defect became
introduced into a product, it must appear by a clear preponderance of
the evidence that there has been no such divided or intervening control
of the product as to afford a reasonable opportunity for it or its contents
to have been tampered with by another after leaving the possession or
control of the defendant or its agents.10 The injured consumer may be
required to introduce evidence tending to show the unlikelihood of an
intermediary as the source of the defective condition.ll Where there is
any intervention of an intermediary source which produces or could
produce the injury complained of,12 or where the position of the con-
taminant itself suggests tampering by some third party, 13 a plaintiff is
unable to rely exclusively upon the condition of the packaging as
evidence to prove this element of her case. In cases involving sealed
containers of food and drink however, where the possession of the sealed
container has passed from the manufacturer into the hands of an inter-
mediary, the ability of a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case solely
with evidence that she examined the package before purchase has been
justified on the grounds that it is very unlikely the sealed container could
be broken after leaving the control of the manufacturer without this fact
being observed by the consumer. 14
Thus, when a plaintiff introduces evidence that (1) she purchased a
food product and observed it to be in a sealed container; (2) that no one
the quantitative data about most matters which would be needed to make meaningful
statements in terms of probabilities. Of course some broad generalizations would
command general assent. These are the judgments of "common sense," but even they
are fallible. How often the science of the morrow makes today's common sense look
foolish!
Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47
VA. L. REv. 218,221-22 (1961).
10. McKittrick v. Dugan Bros. of New Jersey, 197 A. 905 (NJ. 1938).
11. Id. at 907.
12. Miller v. Gerber Prod. Co., 62 S.E.2d 174, 176 (Ga. 1950) (affirming judgment entered for
the defendant in a negligence action where plaintiff allegedly found glass in baby food fed to her
child). The court held that plaintiff had not raised an issue of fact for the jury that the glass was in the
product when it left Gerber's factory. Id. at 176. The plaintiff introduced no evidence of whether the
baby had eaten any other food at the time, or what the baby had been doing just prior to being fed. Id.
See also Love v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 175 So. 2d 398,400 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (noting that
plaintiff had not proven that the ice cream had not been handled by persons other than the
manufacturer and that the record indicated evidence to the contrary).
13. De Luccio v. Wagner Baking Corp., 115 N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (N.Y. App. Term 1952); Miller
v. National Bread Co., 286 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936); Ternay v. Ward Baking Co., 167
N.Y.S. 562, 563 (N.Y. App. Term 1917).
14. See Gross v. Loft, Inc., 185 A. 80, 80-81 (Conn. 1936) (holding that the trial court was
justified in inferring defendant's negligence where the defendant offered no evidence as to the
process, care, or supervision used in the manufacture and handling of its products). Accord Williams
v. General Baking Co., 98 A.2d 779,780 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953); Campbell Soup Co. v. Dusek, 135 So.
2d 414,414 (Miss. 1961); Ford v. Roddy Mfg. Co., 448 S.W.2d 433,436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969); Athens
Canning Co. v. Ballard, 365 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Tex. 1963); Holley v. Purity Baking Co., 37 S.E.2d 729,
732 (W. Va. 1946).
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had an opportunity to tamper with the product from the time the pack-
aging was open to the time the plaintiff consumed the product; and (3)
that the plaintiff did not tamper with the product herself, the plaintiff
establishes a question of fact as to whether the defect was in the product
when it left the control of the manufacturer.1 5 The remaining issue is
what impact should evidence of the defendant's manufacturing process,
tending to exonerate the defendant, have on a consumer's prima facie
case? Where evidence exists rebutting the defendant's claim of its
quality controls, or where the defendant's evidence of its manufacturing
process fails to exclude the possibility that the defect complained of
entered the goods during production, the inferences created by the
plaintiff's circumstantial evidence remain intact as to the question of
when the defect in the product first existed.16 Where there is no evidence
rebutting the defendant's testimony however, should the issue of whether
or not a defect was present in a product while in the defendant's posses-
sion be given to a jury? Before examining the two schools of thought
on this issue, Part III addresses the confusion persisting over whether or
not the defendant's evidence of its quality assurances is even admissible.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF MANUFACTURING
PROCESS AND QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES
Before the development of other tort theories, consumers injured by
adulterated foods sued manufacturers in negligence. A defendant's
evidence of its quality assurances was usually offered to prove due care
in the manufacture of the product. Some jurisdictions held that the mere
presence of impurities in food alone was insufficient evidence of negli-
gence, and they allowed a defendant to introduce proof of its manufac-
turing techniques as evidence of lack of fault.17
Generally, evidence of the processes and procedures utilized by a
manufacturer of packaged foods is not sufficient to rebut a presumption
15. Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 762, 764 (Miss. 1932) (holding plaintiff's circumstantial
evidence was sufficient to raise an inference that glass was in a Baby Ruth candy bar at the time it
was manufactured by the defendant). The absence of direct evidence does not bar recovery. Id. at
764. Had any persons other than the manufacturer placed the glass in the bar, of necessity they would
have had to have melted it, placed glass in it, remolded, recovered it with chocolate, and repackaged it
in its wrapper. Id. Although this scenario was arguably possible, it is "wild conjecture," and did not
prevent the jury from finding that the candy was in its original state when it left the factory. Id. See
also Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dillard, 253 P.2d 847, 850 (Okla. 1953) (holding presence
of dead roach in sealed container makes out prima facie case of negligence against manufacturer).
16. See, e.g., Tyrrell v. Lay, 91 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949) (finding proof of
manufacturer's precautions failed to rebut inference of negligence).
17. Nichols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1929 ); Swenson v. Purity Baking
Co., 236 N.W. 310 (Minn. 1931).
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or inference of negligence to be drawn from a particular incident.' 8
Evidence suggesting that defendants employ modem machinery and
take great precautions in their manufacturing is insufficient to rebut the
inference of negligence drawn from the plaintiffs' evidence that there
was a defect in the product that caused them injury.19 As a result, even
in negligence actions, rarely will a defendant's evidence of its quality
assurance devices be proper when offered to prove the manufacturer's
lack of fault for the defective condition of its product.20
With the advent of breach of warranty and strict liability actions
(where a manufacturer is liable whenever a defect causes injury regard-
less of the care taken to prevent it), the offer of evidence by a defendant
of its manufacturing processes raises further objection and confusion.
The Kansas Supreme Court has twice taken the position that evidence of
a manufacturer's precautions against contamination are inadmissible in
implied warranty cases where negligence is not an issue and therefore
due care is irrelevant.21
In both Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 22 and Simmons
v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,23 the defendants appealed judgments
entered against them on the grounds that it was error for the trial court to
strike from their answer and exclude from evidence matters relating to
the manufacturing and bottling processes employed at their plants.24 In
18. 36A CJ.S. Food § 70(2) (1961).
19. See Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Jones, 21 So. 2d 327, 329-30 (Ala. 1945); Bagre v. Daggett
Chocolate Co., 13 A.2d 757, 759 (Conn. 1940); Collins Baking Co. v. Savage, 150 So. 336, 337 (Ala.
1933); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Schneider, 60 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ky. 1933); Gilbert v. John
Gendusa Bakery, Inc., 144 So. 2d 760, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Richenbacher v. California Packing
Corp., 145 N.E. 281, 282 (Mass. 1924); Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 144 A. 884, 887 (R.I.
1929); Norfolk Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Krausse, 173 S.E. 497,500 (Va. 1934).
20. See, eg., Richenbacher, 145 N.E. at 282 (holding that
[tihe fact that the glass got into the can during the preparation of the spinach and before
the can was sealed, notwithstanding the great care which was customarily used in
canning spinach, was a circumstance which warranted an inference that some person
whose duty it was to see that the system was observed was negligent in the examination
of the contents of the can before it was sealed, if not negligent in preventing the
presence of glass at a place where it could be put or might fall into the can).
21. See Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca Cola Bottling Co., 332 P.2d 258 (Kan. 1958); Simmons v.
Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 309 P.2d 633 (Kan. 1957).
22. 332 P.2d 258 (Kan. 1958).
23. 309 P.2d 633 (Kan. 1957).
24. Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca Cola Bottling Co., 332 P.2d 258, 260 (Kan. 1958); Simmons v.
Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 309 P.2d 633, 634 (Kan. 1957). In Simmons, the defense offered the
testimony of a chemist at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence to describe the bottling process at the
defendant's plant. 309 P.2d at 634. The witness described an experiment that was conducted where
books of matches (the object discovered in Ms. Simmons' bottle) were placed in four separate bottles
which were then subjected to the washing process used at the defendant's plant. Id. The bottles were
then filled and capped in the usual process, and taken to the witness' laboratory for analysis. Id. At
this point, and before the results of the test were revealed, the plaintiffs objection was sustained on
the grounds that this evidence was not relevant to the theory of the lawsuit, in that it was an action
based upon implied warranty and not upon negligence of the defendant in bottling the beverage. Id.
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each case, the plaintiffs presented evidence that they purchased a bottle
of soda from a vending machine, opened the bottle soon after, drank
portions of it and became ill as a result of an impurity they discovered in
the defendant's product. 25 Although when the contaminant was added
to the bottle was precisely the issue the defendants were attempting to
address with the evidence of their manufacturing processes, the Kansas
Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence provided by the
plaintiffs established that there was no question of the soft drinks being
contaminated at the time they were sold to the plaintiffs. 26 As such,
although the defendants' evidence was relevant in proving due care in
the manufacturing of their products, the evidence was held improper
under the plaintiffs' theories where manufacturers are liable whenever a
foreign substance enters their product during manufacture and subse-
quently injures a consumer.27
The Kansas Supreme Court's reasoning has been relied upon
numerous times by plaintiffs suing in warranty and strict liability theo-
ries and seeking to exclude a defendant's proffered evidence of its
quality control devices.28 Adopting the reasoning of the Kansas Court,
the Washington Supreme Court has held that evidence of a defendant's
manufacturing processes, although relevant where due care is at issue, is
inadmissible under breach of warranty claims. 29 This appears to contin-
ue to be controlling law in Washington.30
Plaintiffs have objected to the admission of a defendant's manufac-
turing process evidence on other grounds as well. In Trahan v. Gerber
Food Products, Inc.,31 the plaintiff appealed a verdict in the defendant's
favor in a case where the consumer claimed to have been injured by
glass particles found in pureed food manufactured by the defendant. 32
25. Cernes, 332 P.2d at 260; Simmons, 309 P.2d at 634.
26. Cernes, 332 P.2d at 262; Simmons, 309 P.2d at 635.
27. Cernes, 332 P.2d at 262; Simmons, 309 P.2d at 635.
28. Brown v. General Foods Corp., 573 P.2d 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Hazelton v. Safeway
Stores Inc., 745 P.2d 309 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987); Trahan v. Gerber Food Products, Inc., 520 So.2d 956
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 120 N.W.2d 786 (Mich. 1963);
Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 416 A.2d 956, 960 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Pulley v.
Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 415 P.2d 636 (Wash. 1966).
29. Pulley, 415 P.2d at 639-40 (recognizing that the proffered evidence was germane to
impeaching the credibility of the plaintiff's claims by demonstrating the improbability of a foreign
object escaping the methods and techniques used, but holding such evidence was circumstantial and
did not fulfill the manufacturer's burden of showing who contaminated the particular food product
and, as such, it was inadmissible).
30. Gates v. Standard Brands Inc., 719 P.2d 130, 136-37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
evidence that snake vertebra could not have been in the condition described by the plaintiff, since
peanuts used by the defendant are thoroughly cooked, was admissible despite Pulley since the
evidence was not offered to demonstrate that the Baby Ruth did not contain the snake vertebra at the
time it left the seller).
31. 520 So. 2d 956 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
32. Trahan v. Gerber Food Prods., Inc., 520 So. 2d 956, 957-58 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
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One of the plaintiff's assigned errors on appeal was the admission of the
defendant's testimony of its production methods. 33 The plaintiff argued
that the defendant's purpose in introducing this evidence was to argue
tampering, an affirmative defense, and because Gerber failed to plead
this in its answer, it should have been precluded from presenting such
evidence at trial.34 The court rejected this contention, and held that the
defendant was merely rebutting the allegation of negligent manufactur-
ing. 35 The defendant had always denied that the product had been
produced with any glass in it, and this evidence was introduced in
furtherance of this contention. 36 As such, the court concluded that the
plaintiff could not reasonably have been surprised by this evidence.37
The bulk of jurisdictions that have addressed the question of
admissibility recognize that, although inappropriate where offered to
prove lack of fault, evidence of a manufacturer's procedures of produc-
tion and packaging is admissible when proffered to refute the inference
that the defect existed in the product at the time it left the control of the
defendant. 38 In Brown v. General Foods Corp.,3 9 the plaintiff appealed
a verdict against him. 40 The plaintiff had sued a manufacturer of cereal
for injuries sustained when he ingested a moldy banana peel which he
alleged had been at the bottom of a cereal box.41 One of the grounds
for appeal addressed by the Arizona Court of Appeals was whether the
trial court committed error in admitting, over plaintiff's objection,
evidence relating to the manufacturer's quality control procedures. 42
The plaintiff argued that such evidence was relevant only to establish
improbability, and not impossibility of the event, and as such, is only
relevant when a defendant faces a claim that it breached some duty of
due care.43 The plaintiff asserted that this evidence is not relevant, but
rather highly prejudicial, when the matter before the court involves
implied warranty and strict liability claims.44




37. Trahan, 520 So. 2d at 959.
38. Brown v. General Foods Corp., 573 P.2d 930, 934 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Hazelton v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 745 P.2d 309, 312-13 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987); Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 120 N.W.2d 786, 789 (Mich. 1963); Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 416 A.2d 956,
960 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); Simon v. Graham Bakery, 111 A.2d 884,886 (NJ. 1955); Miller
v. National Bread Co., 286 N.Y.S. 908,909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936).
39. 573 P.2d 930 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
40. Brown v. General Foods Corp., 573 P.2d 930,932 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 931.
43. Id. at 933.
44. Id.
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In rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the court stated that the
questioned testimony constituted circumstantial evidence relevant to an
important issue in the case. 45 To the extent that a plaintiff may rely
upon circumstantial evidence to raise an inference of the existence of
defect, likewise, circumstantial evidence is admissible on the manufactur-
er's behalf if the evidence makes it appear more probable than not that
the product in question did not contain the defect when it left the
manufacturer's hands.46 The court noted that "a manufacturer will
rarely have available anything other than circumstantial evidence to
disprove a plaintiff's claim relating to the discovery and existence of an
alleged defect in a product. '47 Therefore, the evidence is admissible if
relevant and if it tends to show the improbability of the defect as alleged
by the plaintiff.48
In Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Cos.,49 a consumer sued a soup manu-
facturer alleging that a can of soup caused the consumer's hepatitis. 50
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed a verdict
against' the defendant and remanded the case for a new trial.51 The trial
court had refused to admit the testimony of the defendant's
quality-assurance manager as to the manufacturer's precautions against
contamination. 52 The evidence was held inadmissible even though it was
not introduced for the purpose of demonstrating due care, but rather to
disprove the plaintiff's assertions that the contamination existed at the
time the soup was manufactured by the defendant. 53
In reversing the decision, the Johnesee court stated: "In a foreign
substance case, where it is possible for the substance to enter the food
after leaving the manufacturer's hands, evidence that the substance was
not present when the food was under defendant's control would be
relevant to disprove that necessary element of a products liability
claim." 5 4 Even where the evidence does not conclusively exclude the
possibility of contamination, the court found that the evidence would still
be relevant and admissible.55 The court further stated that:
[P]roof that the soup was made under the most hygienic
conditions does not tend to exculpate the maker, since a single
45. Brown, 573 P.2d at 933.
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 934.
48. Id.
49. 416 A.2d 956 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
50. Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 416 A.2d 956,958 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
51. Id. at 961.
52. Id. at 959.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 960.
55. See Johnesee, 416 A.2d at 960.
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can might become contaminated in spite of all reasonable
precautions.
Nevertheless, a certain improbability as to the truth of
plaintiff's version exists which defendants should not be
foreclosed from establishing. The issue is one of credibility.
A manufacturer rarely has available anything more than
circumstantial evidence to disprove a plaintiff's claim relating
to the discovery and existence of an alleged defect in a prod-
uct. Evidence . .. [of the defendant's manufacturing process-
es] should be admissible, not to show lack of fault or the
presence of due care on the manufacturer's part, but rather as
relevant evidence tending to show the improbability of the
defect as claimed by plaintiffs.5 6
The Kansas Court of Appeals has shifted away from the Kansas
Supreme Court's prior holdings. In Hazelton v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,57 a
strict liability claim was brought against a store chain for injuries the
plaintiff sustained when he swallowed a needle discovered in bread
baked by the defendant.5 8 The plaintiff's evidence suggesting needles
were in the bread at the time it left the defendant's control consisted of
the plaintiff's assertions that he observed the packaging to be untamp-
ered; that the crust of the bread also appeared undisturbed; and when he
bit into the bread a needle was inside the product.59 The defendant
sought to introduce evidence of its testing for metal contamination of its
products before distribution. 60 As the defense explained, this was
proffered not to establish due care, but to prove that it was impossible for
the product to have been manufactured with a needle embedded there-
in.61 The trial court followed the rule established by the Kansas Su-
preme Court in Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,62 and
Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,63 and refused to admit the
evidence .64
In reversing the trial court, the Kansas Court of Appeals distin-
guished its holding here from the decisions in Cernes and Simmons on
56. Id.
57. 745 P.2d 309 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
58. Hazelton v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 745 P.2d 309, 310 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 312.
61. Id.
62. 332 P.2d 258 (Kan. 1958). See also supra notes 21-27 (discussing Kansas Supreme Court
position that evidence of manufacturer's due care is irrelevant where negligence is not an issue).
63. 309 P.2d 633 (Kan. 1957). See also supra notes 21-27 (discussing Kansas Supreme Court
position that evidence of manufacturer's due care is irrelevant where negligence is not an issue).
64. Hazelton, 745 P.2d at 313.
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tenuous grounds.65 It held that the prior decisions were "cola cases"
where "there was direct evidence that the contaminant was in the
bottle "66
When, as here, that evidence is circumstantial only, we can rely
upon .. . the principle that, if a plaintiff's circumstantial
evidence sufficiently negates other possible causes so that his
claim has "an inference of probability as distinguished from
mere possibility," the plaintiff has a prima facie case in a strict
liability suit....
"Likewise, circumstantial evidence is admissible on a
defendant manufacturer's behalf if the admission of such
evidence makes it appear more probable than it would other-
wise appear without such evidence that the product in question
did not contain the claimed defect when it left the defendant's
control ."67
The rule of the Kansas Court of Appeals in Hazelton, that the
circumstantial evidence of a defendant's testing procedures are admissi-
ble when a plaintiff's case is supported solely by circumstantial evidence,
although consistent with other jurisdictions that have addressed this
question, is not consistent with the Kansas Supreme Court's previous
resolution of the issue.68 None of the plaintiffs in these Kansas cases
presented any direct evidence that the defect was in the product before it
left the defendant's hands.69 To distinguish Hazelton on these grounds
is specious. Although its supreme court has yet to address this conflict, it
appears that the Cernes and Simmons decisions have become as unpopu-
lar in Kansas as they are in most other jurisdictions.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
68. Compare id. with Cernes v. Pittsburg Coca Cola Bottling Co., 332 P.2d 258,260 (Kan. 1958)
and Simmons v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 309 P.2d 633,634 (Kan. 1957).
69. In Simmons, the plaintiff's testimony was that after drinking about one-third of the soda, her
sister called to her attention that there was some foreign object in the bottle which was later
determined to be a book of matches. 309 P.2d at 634. In Cernes, the plaintiff was handed an open
bottle of Coca Cola about which he noticed nothing unusual until the third swallow when he began to
swallow the foreign substance that made him sick. 332 P.2d at 260. These cases cannot be said to
represent instances where the plaintiffs presented direct evidence that the adulteration discovered was
in the product at the time it left the manufacturer's hands.
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IV. JURISDICTIONS HOLDING A PLAINTIFF'S CIRCUMSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE MAY CREATE AN IRREBUTTABLE
INFERENCE OF PRESENCE OF DEFECT BEFORE THE
PRODUCT LEFT THE CONTROL OF ITS MANUFACTURER
Some jurisdictions hold that when a plaintiff asserts she purchased a
food product that appeared to be undisturbed in its normal packaging,
and that she did not tamper with the product herself, nor was there any
opportunity for anyone else to adulterate the product from the time it
was taken out of its sealed container to the time it was consumed, she has
established a jury question as to the issue of presence of a defect at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control. These jurisdictions
reason that because upon a motion for summary judgment all inferences
should be given to the non moving party, any evidence of a manufactur-
er's quality controls, and the improbability of such an occurrence,
merely raises a fact question for a jury to determine. The remainder of
this section surveys cases from various jurisdictions subscribing to this
position.
In Ford v. Roddy Manufacturing Co.,70 the plaintiff sued a soda
bottler when he suffered injuries from drinking Coca-Cola containing an
insect. 7 1 A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant
appealed, contending that a directed verdict should have been granted. 72
The plaintiff's evidence consisted of his testimony that he purchased a
soda from a vending machine, that it appeared normal, and that nothing
unusual was observed when he opened the bottle.73 The plaintiff also
presented testimony that before the soda was added to the pop machine,
it was kept under lock, and the two individuals who had access to the
beverages testified that they had never tampered with any bottles. 74
Upon opening the soda, the plaintiff immediately drank about one-third
of the contents when he noticed the bug and became sick.75
The defendant's evidence included proof of its bottling process and
sanitary conditions at its bottling facility.76 The bottler established that
from the time bottles are picked up from its customers to the time they
are filled with the soda and capped, they go through an elaborate wash-
ing, rinsing, and inspection process. 77 Although this evidence remained
70. 448 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn.CtApp. 1969).
71. Ford v. Roddy Mfg. Co., 448 S.W.2d 433,434 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1969).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 435.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Ford, 448 S.W.2d at 438.
77. Id. Defendant's proof established that empty bottles are picked up by the defendant from its
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uncontested, the trial court held that proof of the defendant's bottling
process presented a question upon which reasonable minds could
disagree, and that the evidence of the manufacturing process did not
warrant a directed verdict in favor of the defendant.78
The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed.79 Focusing entirely
upon the inferences to be drawn from the plaintiff's evidence, the court
stated:
The question before the Court is whether there was 'reasonable
opportunity' for someone to have tampered with the bottle of
Coca Cola or its contents after it had left the possession and
control of the defendant bottler. If there was such reasonable
opportunity for the bottle to have been tampered with the case
should not have gone to the jury.80
The requirement is satisfied if the plaintiff's evidence sufficiently
eliminates the probability of anything being done to the bottles or their
contents after they left control of the bottler.81 Even though the plain-
tiff's evidence did not wholly exclude the possibility that someone
tampered with the beverage after it left the defendant's control while it
was being stored, the court held the issue of when the insect came to be
in the bottle was one for a jury.82
In Haynes v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,83 a plaintiff became ill after
drinking a can of soft drink purportedly containing paper and fungus.84
The plaintiff sued under theories of negligence and breach of warranty,
and a jury returned a verdict in her favor.85 The defendant appealed on
the grounds that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to raise a jury
customers, washed and refilled. Id. The washing process consists of pre-rinses, washing and rinsing
of the empty bottles. Id. The bottles come out of the washer on a conveyor line where they are both
visually inspected under bright lights by the defendant's employees and also subjected to an electronic
eye inspection. Id. The water used to make the soda is treated at the defendant's plant to remove
foreign substances and purify the water. Id. The water is cooled, carbonated, and passed on to the
filler to be injected into bottles through a fine screen. Id. The syrup is added next where it passes
directly from the drum received by the bottler through a strainer into each bottle. Id. The bottles then




80. Id. at 436.
81. Ford, 448 S.W.2d at 436.
82. Id. at 438-39. The court did recognize that instances may arise where a directed verdict
would be proper, as where the explanatory evidence submitted by the defendant is so strong that
reasonable minds could draw but one conclusion therefrom. Id. at 439. However, given the facts of
this case and the result reached by the court, it is difficult to imagine a case where the court would
adopt this view.
83. 350 N.E.2d 20 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
84. Haynes v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.. 350 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
85. Id.
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question as to the issue of whether the defect existed in the soda at the
time it left the defendant's control.8 6
The plaintiff's evidence consisted entirely of her testimony that she
purchased the can of soda from a factory dispensing machine at her
job.87 The can was not leaking or damaged.88 She opened the can,
heard a fizzing sound, and immediately began drinking from it.89 The
plaintiff drank the contents of the can, even though the taste was some-
what unappealing. 90 After consuming all of the beverage, she discovered
a solid matter at the bottom of the can and immediately became ill.91
The defendant presented testimony of its plant manager whose duty
it was to supervise the canning operations. 92 He described the proce-
dures in processing cans of Coca Cola.93 He also described quality
control examinations performed every thirty seconds on random cans.94
The purpose of this testimony was to establish the impossibility of paper
and fungus having entered a can of soda before a can is sealed at the
plant. 95 The defendant argued that contamination could not have
occurred at its plant prior to sealing because its precautionary practices
and packaging devices would detect any product not fully filled with
liquid.96 Given that fungus could not have grown without air in a sealed
can, the jury could only speculate about how and where the contami-
nants were added.97
On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that the defendant's
evidence ignored the presence of paper in the can as well as the plain-
tiff's evidence that the can fizzed when opened. 98 The court recognized
that the plaintiff must prove that the defect existed in the product at the
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 22.
88. Id.
89. Haynes, 350 N.E.2d at 22.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 23.
93. Id. He testified that the water, syrup and carbonated air, which are mixed together in the
final product, are routed through stainless steel pipes to the mixing phase, and that after the liquid
becomes carbonated, it flows through a similar stainless steel system to the machine which fills the
cans. Id. The cans which are assembled at the plant are placed single file on a conveyor belt. Id.
While on the line, the cans are rinsed with high pressure chlorinated water. Id. Next, they are
immediately filled with the product. Id. In less than one-tenth of a second after being filled, they are
sealed. Id. If the conveyor belt is stopped for any reason, the cans between the filler and the sealer
are removed from the line. Id. Once the cans have been sealed, they are sent to a warmer which
raises the temperature to create greater pressure within the can. Id. The cans then travel to a
"fill-defects" device which checks the liquid level in the cans. Id. If the proper fill is indicated, it lets
the cans pass; if the proper level is not signaled, it rejects them. Id.
94. Haynes, 350 NE.2d at 23.
95. Id. at 23-24.
96. Id. at 24.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 24-25.
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time it left the control of the manufacturer. 99  The court stated that
"[t]his burden may be fulfilled by proof that there was no reasonable
opportunity for tampering with the sealed container or, if there was such
reasonable opportunity, by proof that there was actually no tampering or
adulteration."100 Without reconciling the plaintiff's version of the facts
with the defendant's proof of its manufacturing procedures, the court
held that the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence raised an inference from
which a jury could reasonably determine that a defect existed in the
product at the time it left the control of Coca-Cola.10 1
In Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson,102 the plaintiff sued the manufac-
turer of Baby Ruth candy bars after he was injured by glass he swallowed
when he ate one of the defendant's candy bars.103 The defendant
presented evidence that no articles of glass are permitted in the factory;
that in addition to their uniforms, employees are only permitted to carry
keys for their lockers while working; and that modern methods are
employed in the manufacturing process that would prevent foreign
materials like glass from contaminating a candy bar. 104 The court held
that the plaintiff's assertions that the wrapper was sealed and the smooth
chocolate covering was intact when he proceeded to eat the candy
warranted the jury's finding that the candy bar had been produced with
the glass imbedded in it.105
These cases all hold that a plaintiff's circumstantial evidence,
offered to prove that no reasonable alternative source existed for the
defect to have been introduced, establishes the requisite inference that
the contamination existed at the time the product remained in control of
the manufacturer. Evidence by the defendant of its manufacturing
99. Haynes, 350 N.E.2d at 25.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Id. This case is factually similar to a subsequent Illinois appellate decision where an
opposite result was reached. Compare id. with Warren v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 519 N.E.2d 1197
(I11. App. Ct. 1988). See also infra notes 118-31 and accompanying text (discussing Warren). The
Warren court did not criticize the result in Haynes, but distinguished itself on the ground that, in
Warren, the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence from which one could infer that plaintiffs
illness was the result of the contamination found in the defendant's product. Warren, 519 N.E.2d at
1202-03. This does not adequately explain how the court's other holding (that the plaintiff was unable
to prove existence of defect at the time the product was in the defendant's control) bodes with the
Haynes decision. Id. As a result, the law in Illinois is unclear.
102. 141 So. 762 (Miss. 1932).
103. Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 762,763 (Miss. 1932).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 764-765. A similar holding was made in McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112
S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that despite evidence of methods and precautions taken to
prevent glass from entering into bread manufactured by the defendant, the issue of when the defect
first existed in the product is a jury question). The court stated that the defendant's evidence,
"presented nothing more than a conflict with the evidence presented by plaintiff, and, under the rule
heretofore referred to, defendant's evidence, where it is in conflict with plaintiff's evidence, must be
disregarded." Id. at 855.
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techniques may not erase-the inference drawn from the plaintiff's
evidence. Such evidence proffered by the defendant is only useful for a
jury to weigh in determining the credibility of the plaintiff's version of
the facts.
V. JURISDICTIONS WHERE EVIDENCE OF MANUFACTURING
PROCEDURES MAY REBUT A PLAINTIFF'S CIRCUMSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW ELIMINATING ANY
INFERENCE THAT A DEFECT WAS CONTAINED IN A PROD-
UCT AT THE TIME IT WAS IN THE MANUFACTURER'S
CONTROL
A growing number of jurisdictions hold that the inference estab-
lished by a plaintiff's circumstantial evidence, tending to prove that the
defective condition complained of was in the defendant's product when
it left its manufacturing facilities, may be voided by a defendant's
uncontested evidence of its manufacturing and inspection processes.
The following is a discussion of the cases adhering to this position.
In Tardella v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,106 a plaintiff who had sued the
manufacturer of Baby Ruth candy bars appealed a summary judgment
in the defendant's favor.' 07 The plaintiff had purchased a candy bar
from a convenience store. 108 Upon opening and eating the candy, the
plaintiff's infant daughter was injured when she ingested a 7/8 inch
"beading" pin which was embedded in the candy bar. 109
To supplement its motion for summary judgment, Nabisco provided
affidavits from its quality control personnel describing its production
procedures.110 It was shown that the type of pin which injured plaintiff,
designed to attach sequins to polystyrene decorations, was never used in
and around Nabisco's facility, and that all of the defendant's personnel
wore smocks, had their hair covered, and were prohibited from wearing
jewelry while working in the plant. 111 The raw materials used in produc-
tion were carefully tested, filtered, and inspected for foreign matter.11 2
When the process was complete, the finished product passed through a
metal detector which would have detected and rejected a candy bar
106. 576 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).





112. Tardella, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 966. At the introduction of the peanuts, the most opportune time
for metallic contaminants to enter into the product, the peanuts pass over a number of magnets and are
both visually and electronically inspected. Id. at 967.
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containing metal one-tenth the size of the pin found in plaintiff's candy
bar.1 13
The plaintiff never refuted this evidence nor did she attempt to
establish in some other way a time during the manufacture when the
contaminant could have been introduced.114 The burden upon the
plaintiff was to exclude alternate causes of the accident, or at least render
them "sufficiently 'remote' or 'technical' to enable the jury to reach its
verdict based not upon speculation, but upon the logical inferences to be
drawn from the evidence." 15 In opposition to the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the plaintiff was required to present some
evidence of a means by which the defect became introduced into the
product.116 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
defendant's evidence satisfied the movant's burden on summary judg-
ment of establishing prima facie that the pin was not in the candy bar
when it left the defendant's manufacturing and distribution facilities.'l 7
In Warren v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. ,1 18 the Illinois Appellate Court
re-examined a case where a consumer of a soft drink sued the manufac-
turer of the syrup and the bottler claiming that she became ill from
drinking a contaminated can of soft drink.'19 The defendants were
granted their motions for summary judgment by the circuit court and
the consumer appealed. 120 The court held that in addition to not being
able to establish that the bacteria found in the soda can was the cause of
her illness, the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence was insufficient to raise
the requisite inference that the bacteria was present in the soft drink at
the time the product left the control of either defendant.121
Similar to the plaintiffs' evidence in the cases discussed throughout
this paper, Ms. Warren testified that she bought a single, cold, flip-top
can of Coca-Cola taken from the cooler of a convenience store. 122 The
top of the can appeared to be clean. 123 Before the plaintiff was even
finished paying for the soda, she opened the can, observed that it had
normal carbonation, and took a "big gulp."'12 4 She immediately
noticed that the cola tasted bad, and within five minutes after tasting the
113. Id. at 967.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Schneider v. Kings Highway Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 490 NE.2d 1221, 1221 (N.Y.
1986)).
116. Id.
117. Tardella, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
118. 519 N.E.2d 1197 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
119. Warren v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 519 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1202.
122. Id. at 1199.
123. Id.
124. Warren, 519 N.E.2d at 1199.
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drink, she felt nauseated and sick to her stomach. 125 She was taken to
the hospital and remained there for six days where she suffered stomach
cramps, diarrhea, and bouts of vomiting.126 Tests of the soda performed
after the plaintiff was released from the hospital revealed heightened
levels of fecal organisms. 127
In addition to other grounds advanced in their motion for summary
judgment, Coca-Cola argued that there was no evidence to support the
contention that any bacteria was in the soft drink when it left the compa-
ny's control.128 The court of appeals agreed, holding that the mere fact
that an injury occurs in consumption of a product does not raise the
presumption, or otherwise create an inference entitling the consumer to
recover against a manufacturer under a theory of negligence, breach of
warranty, or strict liability.129
Plaintiff presented no evidence in the form of counter-affidavit, or
otherwise, to contradict the affidavit of [Coca-Cola's Quality Assurance
Vice President], which described the closed system in which the syrup is
manufactured by defendant Coca-Cola, from which the court could infer
that any bacteria was present in the syrup when it left the control of the
company for bottling.130
The plaintiff failed to adequately set forth evidentiary facts by
which a jury could reasonably infer that the soda was contaminated with
bacteria when it left the control of either defendant.131
A recent case advancing this position is Campbell Soup Co. v.
Gates;132 a case where a plaintiff sued a food manufacturer when she
purchased a package of Ramen Noodle Soup infested with beetle lar-
vae.133 According to the plaintiff, when she purchased the product, the
packaging was sealed with no holes in it.134 Immediately upon returning
home, the plaintiff took three noodle packages out of the shopping bag,
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1200.
128. Id. at 1200-01. Coca-Cola supplemented its motion with an affidavit of its Vice President of
Quality Assurance for Coca-Cola USA. Id. at 1201. The evidence established that the syrup used in
the defendant's product is manufactured in a completely closed system in which materials received in
sealed containers, are transferred directly to closed tanks for storage until transfer to a mixing vessel.
Id. The final syrup product is strained through a stainless steel mesh with openings of 0.004 of an
inch. Id. Tests are conducted on the strained syrup, and the product is then packaged into thoroughly
cleaned and inspected containers for shipment to bottlers. Id. This evidence remained uncontested by
the plaintiff. Id. at 1202.
129. Warren, 519 N.E.2d at 1202 (citations omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 889 S.W.2d 750 (Ark. 1994).
133. Campbell Soup Co. v. Gates, 889 S.W.2d 750,751-52 (Ark. 1994).
134. Id. at 751.
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and poured them in a sauce pan of boiling water.135 After consuming
about half of the bowl, the plaintiff observed tiny worms in the product
and became sick.136
The defendant's evidence established that none of the other pack-
ages from the supermarket where the plaintiff purchased the soup were
contaminated, nor had the defendant ever received other reports of
infested products.137 Evidence of Campbell's manufacturing techniques
was also presented in an attempt to establish the impossibility of the
plaintiff's contentions. 138 A microbiologist, who identified the beetle
larvae and who was familiar with the manufacturing process of the soup,
testified that during production the noodles are steamed for a half-
minute at 212 degrees Fahrenheit, folded into blocks, deep-fried for
another half-minute at 330 degrees, cooled for about a minute and a half
at 100 degrees, and then immediately packaged.1 39 According to the
witness, the larvae could not have survived either the steaming or
deep-frying process as they could not survive temperatures above 140
degrees.140
Campbell moved for a directed verdict on the ground that there was
no basis on which the jury could infer any defect in the noodles at the
time they left the manufacturer's hands.141 The court denied the motion
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.142 On appeal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court held that a directed verdict should have been
granted.143 "The evidence presented by Ms. Gates in her effort to
assign liability to Campbell Soup Company did not show that the prod-
uct in question was in a defective condition when it left Campbell's
hands; nor was there sufficient evidence to negate the existence of other




138. Gates, 889 S.W.2d at 754.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 752.
142. Id.
143. Gates, 889 S.W.2d at 754.
144. Id. An older decision from Kentucky also seems to follow the reasoning of the decisions
discussed in this section. See Ewing Von Allmen Dairy Co. v. Miller, 264 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1954). In
Miller, the court reversed a judgment in favor of a plaintiff whose three year old child swallowed a
piece of wire allegedly originating from ice cream produced by the defendant. Id. at 863. The
plaintiff-mother's testimony consisted of evidence that upon arriving home from the store where she
had purchased ice cream, she took the carton and without opening it, cut it in half giving each of her
children a half carton and spoon. Id. When plaintiff heard her child choking, she put her finger in the
child's throat and pulled out a very small wire. Id.
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish with "the requisite high degree of proof" that
the wire was in the ice cream at the time it left the control of the defendant. Id. at 863-64. One of the
factors relied upon to make this determination was the defendant's evidence of its manufacturing and
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VI. WHY REQUIRING PLAINTIFFS TO REBUT EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT'S MANUFACTURING PROCESSES BEST
BALANCES THE INTERESTS OF BOTH PARTIES
Many believe there is a litigation crisis in America which is crip-
pling industry through product liability suits. 145 Such fears have been
the impetus for radical "reform" proposals in the current U.S.. Con-
gress.146 Food and beverage producers face as much pressure as any-
one. 147 In addition to being a perennial target for lawsuits, these manu-
facturers must address countervailing demands from consumers for less
packaging, lower costs, and decreased use of chemicals and other artifi-
cial methods of preservation. 148
Regardless of whether one believes the situation is at a crisis level,
companies should not be subjected to defending, through trial, unsub-
stantiated claims simply because a plaintiffs case is artfully pleaded. In
these cases, even when manufacturers "win" at trial, they (and ultimately
packaging systems. Id. at 863. Defendant's superintendent of production testified that the product
was produced in an enclosed system where no human hand or outside air entered. Id. He further
testified that the milk (1) enters a filter of 112 discs which spin at great speeds to throw out any foreign
substance which might be in the milk; (2) is piped through sterilizing processes and subjected to great
amounts of pressure so the nothing but liquid can pass through; (3) flows into the freezers where the
"pumps are so precisely set that no foreign substance can go through them," and finally; (4) the ice
cream is packed into cartons by machinery. Id. In assessing this evidence, the court noted that "here
the proof showed there was no opportunity to tamper with this ice cream carton,: and that "it was next
to impossible for this wire to have gotten in the ice cream in its plant and before delivery to the store."
Id. at 863,864.
Despite the court's endorsement of the evidence of the defendant's manufacturing process,
another justification for the decision was the fact that the injured girl was only three years old. Id. at
864. The plaintiff could not exclude the possibility that the wire came from some other source. Id.
The court stated: "From all that is shown in the record, she might have gotten the wire off the kitchen
table or in the automobile, or numerous other places, and had it in her mouth when she started eating
the ice cream." Id. Given this factor, it is difficult to predict what impact this decision will have in a
case in Kentucky where the plaintiff herself asserts that a contaminant was in the product while she
was consuming it and where a defendant's evidence suggests the mismanufacture of the type asserted
is unlikely.
145. There exists the perception that because of their wealth, and the ease of suing in strict
liability, manufacturers have become lightning rods for lawsuits. The figures of today tend to support
this view whether one compares the number of lawsuits, the number and size of damage awards,
insurance rates, or even the number of lawyers from those of the 1970s. See Harry Bacas, Liability:
Trying Times, NATION'S BUSINESS, Feb. 1986, at 22-23; George J. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is
Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16-17.
146. Church, supra note 145,at 17.
147. Signs of Change, PACKAGING WEEK, Aug. 14, 1991,at 24.
148. Id.
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consumers) end up paying a large price in defending themselves. 149
Legal gate-keepers, especially summary judgment motions, should serve
their purpose of preventing claims from proceeding without sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case. The rule of those jurisdictions
where a plaintiff is denied recovery as a matter of law absent evidence
rebutting the defendant's proof of its manufacturing techniques best
respects the rights of both litigants. 150 Defendants are relieved of the
burden of having to proceed in defending themselves against claims
when plaintiffs have no evidence to suggest that a defect complained of
was in the product when it left the defendants' control. Plaintiffs may
raise a material issue of fact simply by refuting the defendant's evidence
of its production procedures.
Those jurisdictions holding that a plaintiff raises a question of fact
merely by asserting that prior to purchasing the product she examined it,
observed it to be in a sealed container, and that she neither added the
defect herself nor did anyone else have any opportunity to do so, are
misguided.151 The focus of these decisions is on whether or not the
plaintiff's evidence accounts for other potential causes of the defect
from the time the product left the manufacturer's hands to the time the
plaintiff purchased and consumed it, thus suggesting that any alternative
149. See, e.g., Trahan v. Gerber Food Prod. Inc., 520 So. 2d 956 (La. Ct. App. 1987). This case
is a good example of both the fraud that may confront food and beverage companies, and the impor-
tance of which quality control evidence should play in controlling unmeritorious claims. See id. The
plaintiff asserted that she had purchased six of defendant's baby food jars and observed that the
"safety buttons" on all of them, which pop up after being opened, were down. Id. at 958. She further
testified that the jar of squash she opened emitted a sharp "pop" as she twisted the cap off, that she
inspected the jar's contents by looking for discoloration around the lid, and seeing none, began feeding
her son. Id. Moments later, she observed blood oozing from his mouth and discovered that the squash
contained a protruding piece of glass. Id. Analysis of the contents of five of the jars revealed that
four of them contained glass fragments. Id. The sixth jar remained unopened until trial. Id.
In the face of this damning evidence, Gerber demonstrated that during the manufacturing
process each jar and lid are individually and identically coded with letters and numbers which identify
the type of food, and the date and place of manufacture. Id. Thus, a jar and lid of one of Gerber's
products should have the same code identifying the same food, manufacturing plant, and date. Id.
The jar and lid of the squash from which plaintiff claimed to have been feeding her son revealed a jar
coded in North Carolina and a lid coded in Arkansas, and although the jar identified the contents as
squash, the lid identified the food as carrots. Id. The defendant further established that the glass
fragments were not of the same type of glass as used in its jars, nor was there any other glass in and
around the production area, including windows. Id.
Gerber additionally demonstrated that a jar could be heated in a microwave oven with the lid on
causing the lid to redepress. Id. Evidence of its capping procedures revealed that a seam on every jar
makes a corresponding indentation on every lid during the capping phase as the lids are heated to mold
their shapes onto the jars. Id. In examining the plaintiff's sixth jar that had remained unopened until
trial, it was discovered that the seam lines were not aligned, thus indicating that the jar had been
previously opened. Id.
150. See supra part V (discussing cases in which plaintiff's failed in their burden to exclude
alternate causes of the defect).
151. See supra part IV (discussing cases in which circumstantial evidence may create an
irrebuttable inference of presence of defect before leaving control of the manufacturer).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
sources are unlikely to have been the cause of the defect and thus the
manufacturer must be the culprit. Although excluding other potential
causes is certainly an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case, the
ultimate burden on the plaintiff is to establish a reasonable inference that
the defect was in the product when it left the manufacturer's control.
When the defendant establishes that its product could not reason-
ably have been the source of the defect in the product, then the plain-
tiffs evidence attempting to rule out alternative sources is ineffective in
raising an inference that the defect existed at the time of manufacture.
If, for example, a defendant proves that from the time raw materials are
added to the time a sealed container of the end product exits, a closed
system, free from human hands, sifts the raw materials, produces the
product, detects defects, and packages the product,152 the inference that
the product contained the defect before it left the factory is just as
unreasonable as the notion that it was added sometime later. Because the
defendant's evidence makes any inference to be drawn from the plain-
tiff's testimony unlikely, the focus should shift to whether an opportuni-
ty existed for the contamination to have occurred while the product was
in the defendant's hands. Accordingly, plaintiffs should be required to
rebut the evidence presented by the manufacturer to re-establish a
question of fact for a jury.
Requiring consumers in these cases to refute the defendant's
evidence does not place an unreasonable requirement upon them. The
plaintiff may still, and in most cases undoubtedly will, rely exclusively
upon circumstantial evidence. Even though the plaintiff's ultimate
burden will be to prove that the defect existed before the manufacturer
gave up control of the product, at this stage all that is required of the
plaintiff is to raise an inference of this fact. The plaintiff can accomplish
this by presenting evidence that merely disputes the defendant's claims
that it is impossible for contamination to occur while in the manufactur-
er's control.
Three types of evidence would sufficiently rebut a defendant's
testimony of its production techniques. First, a plaintiff may present
some extraneous evidence disclaiming the defendant's assertions. The
plaintiff might also present evidence which on its face demonstrates an
existing opportunity for the defect which injured plaintiff to have
entered the product at the manufacturer's facility. Finally, the plaintiff
may provide an expert who has knowledge of the production techniques
utilized by the defendant and who can demonstrate a means by which
152. See Ewing Von Allmen Dairy Co. v. Miller, 264 S.W.2d 862 (Ky.App. 1954).
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the defect potentially became added to the product while under the
defendant's control.
Adoption of this rule best harmonizes the interests of both parties
by placing the focus back on the plaintiff's burden of proving that the
defect existed in the product while under the manufacturer's control. It
does not place an unreasonable burden upon plaintiffs in establishing a
prima facie case against these manufacturers for injuries caused by
tainted products. If anything, such a rule would arguably place an
additional incentive upon food and beverage manufacturers to continue
to develop and employ even safer and sanitary manufacturing tech-
niques.
VII. CONCLUSION
Even under a theory of strict liability, a manufacturer has never
been held to insure consumers of its product against all injuries associat-
ed with its use. For this reason, it is the plaintiff's prima facie burden to
prove that a contaminant in a food or beverage which caused her injury
was in the product at the time it left the custody and control of the
defendant-manufacturer. Given that circumstantial evidence can be
highly probative and persuasive, a plaintiff should never be prevented
from establishing a case based exclusively on such evidence. However,
where this evidence fails to establish an element of the plaintiff's case, as
in instances where a defendant presents evidence of its manufacturing
procedures to prove that such a defect could not have been added to the
product during manufacture, the plaintiff should be required to refute
such evidence before proceeding with her case.
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